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China’s economic cooperation related investment:  
An investigation of its direction and some implications for outward investment 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a fairly large literature that examines the drivers of aggregate flows of outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as decisions of individual firms to invest overseas. In 
the recent past, the focus of this literature has shifted from multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
based in developed countries to those that are based in emerging markets such as Brazil, 
China and India.
1
 It is now well understood that the emerging market MNEs (EMNEs) do not 
conform to the traditional view of MNEs. Indeed, in most cases, these firms do not possess 
capabilities similar to developed country MNEs and that, indeed, overseas expansion is often 
a means to acquire such capabilities. The high profile acquisitions of IBM’s personal 
computer business by Lenovo of China and the Jaguar-Land Rover brands by Tata Motors of 
India are examples of this pursuit of capabilities.  
The small but growing literature on EMNEs has examined how certain characteristics 
that manifest their successful survival in contexts with missing institutions and markets might 
be detrimental for successful overseas expansion. For example, it is now well understood that 
family ownership and formation of business groups in emerging markets are an optimal 
response to an environment of weak contract enforcement and missing (or imperfect) capital 
markets, respectively (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). But, as recent research suggests, 
family control or business group affiliation discourages overseas investment on account of 
factors such as weak corporate governance in such firms and reluctance to bear the cost of 
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altering the style of management in an alien environment about which the emerging market 
firm has little information (see Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010, and the references therein).  
 The literature has also examined the role of alliances among firms and those between 
firms and overseas investors in facilitating internationalisation of emerging market firms, 
mostly in the context of Asian EMNEs (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Mathews, 2006; Zhan, 1995). 
Surprisingly, however, it has overlooked the advantages that EMNEs generally tend to derive 
from alliances with their own governments. Yet, there are a large number of examples that 
highlight the role of states in promoting business interests of national firms. The advantages 
enjoyed by Chinese and Indian petroleum firms in the Sakhalin oil and gas fields in Russia, 
as also in countries like Venezuela and Sudan, and the support provided by the Indian 
government for Mittal Steel (technically, a Dutch company!) when the latter experienced 
difficulties with its bid for Arcelor provide examples of the role that states can and do play in 
the internationalisation and expansion processes of EMNEs. Indeed, while the ability of states 
to promote domestic firms using subsidies or tax advantages has been reduced in the post-
WTO era, it is well understood that at least some of them still retain the ability to influence 
decisions in favour of their domestic firms using soft power. While state support can be 
important for EMNEs (or firms in general) in any industry, it is likely to prove crucial when 
these firms seek access to resources that are viewed as those of national importance (and 
thereby usually government controlled) by other countries.
2
 
 In this paper, we address this lacuna in the literature, by attempting to reconcile a 
state’s – in this case China’s – projection of soft power with factors that usually determine the 
extent and direction of outward FDI from emerging markets. The choice of China as focus of 
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is that of the failed 2005 bid by the China National Offshore Oil Company Limited (CNOOC) to 
acquire Unocal, the US oil company. The access available to Chinese and Indian oil companies to 




our analysis is interesting on two counts. First, there is a conjecture that the Chinese state 
facilitates outward FDI of Chinese MNEs, by providing crucial linkages with destination 
countries (Buckley et al., 2008). Further, a noticeable proportion of the overseas ventures of 
Chinese firms has been in resource-rich developing countries where resources are de jure or 
de facto under government control and not easily accessible through market transactions.
3
 
Our proxy for the projection of soft power is the Chinese state’s implicit promotion and 
support of Chinese contractor activities related to economic cooperation in other countries.  
Since these activities are mostly engineering construction projects which provide long-term 
benefits to foreign countries, we view them as China’s investment on relationship building 
abroad.  We find that the amount and direction of this economic cooperation investment can 
be well explained by factors that are used in the stylised literature to explain overseas FDI of 
firms. We, therefore, conclude that there is prima facie evidence that the Chinese state uses 
economic cooperation as a tool to facilitate overseas FDI of the Chinese MNEs (CMNEs).  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the role of the 
Chinese state in facilitating outward FDI. The regression specification is outlined in Section 
3. In Section 4, we discuss the data and the empirical strategy. The regression results and 
their implications are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Outward Investment and the Chinese State 
It is generally agreed that CMNEs enjoy certain firm-specific advantages that they can 
leverage as they expand their operations overseas. They are able to access capital at a cost 
that is lower than their global rivals. In part, this is on account of access to cheap credit 
offered by the Chinese state-owned banks or, in the case of state-owned firms, by the state 
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“non-trade enterprises” in the rest of the world (Hong and Sun, 2006). Most of this was in the 




itself (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006; Lardy, 1998; Warner, Hong and Xu, 2004). Access to 
inexpensive capital can also be the outcome of internal capital markets operated by Chinese 
conglomerates (Tsai, 2002). CMNEs are also able to leverage their relationships with the 
Chinese diaspora in the countries in which they invest, reducing the risk associated with such 
investment (Lecraw, 1977; Zhan, 1995). 
 During the early years of the reform process, Chinese overseas investments were 
dominated by large state-owned companies, and key investment decisions, including location 
of overseas operations, were dictated by political considerations (Hong and Sun, 2006). For 
example, the decision to invest in Hong Kong’s infrastructure was aimed at enhancing 
Chinese influence in what was, at that time, British territory on which China had a claim. By 
1992, the ideological debate about the direction of China’s reform had been resolved, and 
encouragement of overseas investment by Chinese firms became an established part of the 
state’s long term strategy. Overseas investment emerged as a tool to gain access to both 
technology and natural resources. High profile examples of such investments include those 
made in Indonesian and Algerian oil fields, South African mines, the Brazilian steel industry 
and the US technology sector. Outward FDI was also aimed at providing Chinese companies 
access to overseas markets and international brands. Haier, for example, invested in 
production facilities in the United States to partly bypass quotas and anti-dumping measures, 
while TCL gained access to the Thomson and Alcatel brands. The 1992-98 period witnessed 
a cautious implementation of this strategy to go global, but the strategy has been pursued 
vigorously since 1999. There is a growing literature on the strategic aspects of the 
transnationalization process of CMNEs (Sauvant, 2005; Zhang, 2005). 
 The determinants of the direction of Chinese outward FDI itself have been examined. 
Buckley et al. (2007) have demonstrated that, in keeping with expectations, outward FDI 
from China is positively associated with the size of the host market, its cultural proximity to 
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China, and its openness to FDI. Their results are also consistent with the popular perception 
about the natural resource-seeking nature of Chinese outward FDI (see Deng, 2003). 
However, contrary to expectations, FDI is also positively correlated with a country’s political 
risk. They explain this anomaly by alluding to the low cost of capital for CMNEs, especially 
those in the public sector, and the apparent lack of sophistication of risk evaluation processes 
of these companies.  
However, while the determinants of Chinese outward FDI have been examined (see 
Buckley et al., 2007, and the references therein), despite the dominant role of the Chinese 
state in setting the agenda for strategic overseas investment, an examination of the largely 
state driven activities that might be correlated with outward FDI and, in some cases, form the 
basis for investment-for-resources (for CMNEs) swap in resource-rich countries, has 
remained largely unexamined. This is despite the state’s dominant role in the Chinese 
economic landscape (Child and Tse, 2001), and despite the proximity of a large majority of 
the CMNEs to the Chinese state (Cheng and Ma, 2007). Indeed, the only known research that 
has linked the Chinese state’s bilateral relations with other countries with outward FDI from 
China has examined the impact of the country’s double taxation treaty – much more an 
economic incentive for firms than a proxy for the Chinese state’s strategic engagement with 
the potential destination countries – on such FDI (Buckley et al., 2008).  
 As mentioned earlier, in this paper, we examine the overseas economic cooperation 
activities of Chinese contractors. Given these firms ties with the Chinese state, these activities 
arguably capture a strategic dimension in China’s international engagement.  In 2006, 
turnover from such economic cooperation activities was close to US$ 35.7 billion, twice the 
magnitude of China’s net outward FDI of US$ 17.6 billion.4 A large proportion of this 
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investment is aimed at building infrastructure in the recipient countries, especially in 
developing countries. In late 2004, for example, Chinese contractors built office buildings in 
Luanda and repaired Angola’s railway system that was mostly destroyed during the country’s 
27-year long civil war (Walt, 2006). In Iran, such investment has been used to develop 
transport-related infrastructure and dams (Walt, 2005). In both countries, soon after the 
initiation of “economic cooperation”, Chinese oil and gas companies, who are at the forefront 
of Chinese outward FDI, received licences to operate large oil fields. While any causality 
between the economic cooperation and the aforementioned licence cannot be established 
without further evidence, it is easy to see that there is evidence of at least correlation between 
China’s economic cooperation related investment on both subsequent outward FDI of 
Chinese companies and on their access to resources that are of national importance to other 
countries.  Indeed, available data, reported in Figure 1, show that China’s economic 
cooperation related investment in 2004-2006 and subsequent (2006-2008) outward FDI are 
positively correlated.  
INSERT Figure 1 about here 
3. Model Specification 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, we examine whether factors that are used in the stylised 
literature to explain amount and direction of outward FDI can also explain satisfactorily the 
amount and direction of China’s economic cooperation related investment.  If they do, we 
would be able to conclude that there is at least prima facie evidence that this investment, 
which is arguably a proxy for the Chinese state’s strategic projection of soft power, facilitates 
the outward FDI of CMNEs.  
The basis for our empirical exercise is the gravity model that is widely used in 





 In its most basic form, the gravity equation includes trading partners’ gross domestic 
products, per capita gross domestic products, and physical distance from each other.
6
 The 
model has reliably explained trade and investment flows across countries, and hence its 
popularity. The basic gravity equation can be extended to include other “distance” variables 
that either enhance or impede bilateral investment flows. Accordingly, we use as the basis of 
our analysis a gravity model that is extended to take into account other factors such as 
cultural similarity and resource richness of the destination countries for the Chinese economic 
cooperation. Following Fan et al. (2009), we also account for potential host countries’ growth 
prospects and macroeconomic stability.
7
  Additionally, we take into consideration the impact 
of institutional quality in potential host countries for Chinese outward FDI, an important 
factor influencing FDI flows (Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova, 1998). Our regression 
model, therefore, is as follows: 
 ECIi = α + Γ΄X + Φ΄Z + e        (1) 
where X is a vector that includes variables that capture the stylised gravity model, Z is a 
vector of other variables that might affect FDI flows, and e is the i.i.d. error term.  
The literature on gravity models suggests that the following variables should be 
included in X:  
The GDP of the ECI (and hence potentially FDI) recipient country (GDP) captures 
market size. In general, larger countries are expected to receive a larger volume of FDI. This 
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inverse function of the physical distance between them.  
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would especially be true if outward FDI is market seeking, which is apparently the case with 
at least a part of Chinese outward FDI (Taylor, 2002; Zhang, 2003).  
The per capita GDP of the ECI recipient country (GDPPC) captures its state of 
development. Its impact on the volume of FDI is theoretically indeterminate. On the one 
hand, outward FDI to developed countries facilitates access to technology or products that 
developing country firms are unable to develop on their own. On the other hand, there is also 
evidence to suggest that developing country firms tend to invest more in countries at similar 
stages of development, where they can leverage their experience and competitive advantages 
acquired in their home countries (Cross et al., 2007), and where they are better able to meet 
the price-quality expectations of the consumers (Lecraw, 1977) than their developed country 
rivals. 
The geographical distance between the source and recipient countries of ECI 
(GEODIST) that captures the transportation cost of doing business. It is easy to see that the 
relationship between FDI and geographical distance is type dependent. The extent of 
horizontal FDI increases with geographical distance because distance increases the 
transactions cost of trade (Brainard, 1993; Horstman and Markusen, 1987; Markusen and 
Venables, 1998). By contrast, vertical FDI and distance have an inverse relationship on 
account of the adverse impact of transport cost on input cost (Helpman, 1984). The empirical 
evidence suggests that, on balance, the relationship between FDI and geographical distance 
between source and recipient countries is indeed inverse (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Shatz and 
Venables, 2001).  
 In the Z vector, to begin with, we control for economic fundamentals of the ECI-
recipient countries. If economic cooperation related investment is intended to facilitate 
greater economic integration between China and the recipient countries, by way of trade and 
Chinese outward FDI, it should at least in part be driven by such economic fundamentals. Fan 
10 
 
et al. (2009) suggest the inclusion of two factors related to potential host countries’ economic 
track record. One factor is related to economic growth expectations (EXPGROW) while the 
other captures the stability of these countries economic performance (INSTAB). They argue 
that there are more investment opportunities in countries where expected growth is higher 
and where macroeconomic policies are more predictable (thus, where economic outcomes are 
more stable). 
We then include the cultural distance between China and the potential ECI recipient 
country that captures the non-transportation transactions cost of doing business (CULDIST). 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) have argued that cost of entry increases with distance while 
operational benefits and ability to transfer core competencies to overseas operations are 
inversely related to it. Similarly, Rauch (1999) suggests that the cost of doing business with 
countries that are culturally close is lower. 
The evidence about the nature of the relationship between bilateral trade between 
China and potential recipient of ECI (BITRADE) that captures the extent to which the two 
economies are integrated, and perhaps also whether at least one of the two countries has 
resources that are of strategic importance to the other.
8
 The empirical evidence about the 
impact of bilateral trade on FDI flows is mixed. Egger (2001), for example, argues that, for 
European countries, exports and outward FDI are substitutes, while Bevan and Estrin (2004) 
and Liu, Wang and Wei (2001) find that exports (imports) and outward (inward) FDI are 
complementary.  
  Next, we include a measure of institutional quality (INSTQLTY), or business 
environment, that impact performance and hence strategic decisions of firms. It is stylised 
that weak institutions in the form of weak property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Lee and 
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Mansfield, 1996), and corruption (Wei, 2000) can have adverse impact on FDI flows, largely 
by increasing uncertainty and increasing contracting cost. However, from the Chinese 
perspective, institutional quality may be less important, and indeed Chinese firms may be 
attracted to countries with weak institutions. This is because Chinese firms “have developed 
sophisticated measures that help them operate despite endemic government interference and 
related problems.” (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008, p. 346).9 Indeed, this ability to deal with 
(or even thrive) in contexts where institutions are weak is not specific to Chinese firms. 
Recent research suggests that this is also true for firms from other emerging markets such as 
India and that therefore developing countries are preferred destinations for outward FDI from 
these countries (Bhaumik and Driffield, forthcoming). 
 Finally, we include two variables that capture the popular wisdom about Chinese 
strategic economic interests in other countries. First, we include a measure for the natural 
resource endowment of the recipient country (NR). As we have already noted, part of the 
Chinese “go global” strategy is to gain access to scarce natural resources. There is evidence 
to suggest that a significant proportion of outward FDI by Chinese companies, led by state-
owned firms, is in natural resources (Cai, 1999; Zhan, 1995; Morck et al., 2008: Table 3). 
There is also evidence to suggest that this activity has been actively supported by the Chinese 
state (Jubany and Poon, 2006). Second, we also include a measure of political rights in the 
recipient country (POLRIGHT). This not only accounts for the popular perception that 
China’s strategic interests include developing business relationships with resource rich 
developing countries with autocratic regimes, it is also consistent with the more general 
empirical evidence (Mathur and Singh, 2007; Schulz, 2007).
10
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account for 63.9, 26.3 and 3.4% of the [Chinese] FDI stock, respectively, and the shares for North 
America and Europe are each below 3%.” 
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 Our regression specification, therefore, is as follows: 
ECIi = α + γ1 GDPi + γ2 GDPPCi + γ3 GEODISTi  + 1 EXPGROWi 
+ 2 INSTABi + 3 CULDISTi + 4 BITRADEi + 5 INSTQLTYi + 6 NRi 
+ 7 POLRIGHTi + ei        (2) 
where i is the index for the ECI recipient countries. We also experiment with interactions 
between NR and the measures of institutional quality and political rights. The purpose of this 
experiment is to examine whether the Chinese state interact differently with resource rich 
countries that have different levels of institutional quality and political rights – Australia, 
Russia and Nigeria, for example – or, conversely, whether the way in which the Chinese state 
interact with a country with a given level of institutional quality or political right depends on 
whether or not that country is resource rich (see Schulz, 2007). 
If indeed economic cooperation related investment manifests the Chinese state’s 
strategic interests and projection of soft power in a way that subsequently facilitates outward 
FDI of CMNEs, we should observe two things. First, this specification, which is used in the 
stylised literature to explain quantity and direction of FDI flows, should also explain the 
quantity and direction of ECI reasonably well. Second, the qualitative impact of these 
explanatory variables on Chinese economic cooperation related investment should be 
consistent with those observed in the stylised FDI literature. We shall revisit these issues later 
in the paper. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
                                                                                                                                                        
than in an environment where multiple agents with diverse interests wield veto powers. Mathur and 
Singh (2007) argue that “democratizing developing economies are often unable to push through the 
kind of economic reforms that investors desire, due to the presence of competing political interests” 
(p. 5). This is also consistent with evidence from the sub-national level in India which suggests that 
firm entry in a state is inversely related to the extent of democracy in it (Bhaumik, Gangopadhyay and 




The data on China’s economic cooperation related investment – the dependent variable in our 
regression model – are obtained from various editions of China Statistical Yearbook.11 These 
are annual turnover measured in (millions of) US dollars from foreign contracted projects 
such as construction of dams, roads and railways.  
 The data for the explanatory variables in equation (2) are collected from a number of 
sources. Data on GDP and per capita GDP, measured in constant 2000 international dollars, 
are obtained from the 2005 version of the World Development Indicators that are released 
annually by the World Bank. Data on bilateral trade between China and each of the recipient 
countries are obtained from the aforementioned Yearbooks.  
 Following Fan et al. (2009), we measure expected growth rate for period t as the 
average of per capita real GDP growth rates for t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4 and t-5. The authors also 
suggest that the standard deviation of per capita real GDP growth rates for these five years 




Measures of geographical and cultural distance are from the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). The measure of geographical distance 
(in kilometers) is based on the great circle formula using the latitudes and longitudes of the 
most important cities in the countries.
13
 Following Rauch (1999), our proxy for cultural 
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years due to data availability. 
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distance is commonality of language; it is a dichotomous variable equal to one if a language 
is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both China and the ECI recipient country. 
In keeping with the literature (see Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009), we use as 
proxies of institutional quality indices generated by the Heritage Foundation. Since indices 
measuring various aspects of institutional quality are highly correlated, we choose the 
corruption index as our measure of this quality. This is consistent with the large literature on 
the impact of corruption on FDI. The index has a range of zero through 100, and a high 
measure on this 100-point scale indicates low incidence of corruption.  
Information about the natural resource endowments of the recipient countries for 
Chinese investment, measured as the shares of energy and non-energy minerals in their 
exports, were also obtained from the World Development Indicators. These are the best 
available proxies for the relative importance of resources in a country’s economy. Ideally, we 




Finally, also in keeping with the stylised literature, we use as our measure of the 
quality of political rights in the recipient countries the index reported by Freedom House. It is 
a 7-point index, with a score of 1 indicating the highest level of political freedom. 
 Since data for developing countries – destination for a significant proportion of 
Chinese economic cooperation related investment – are not always available for all the years, 
we have sometimes had to substitute missing values with available values of the 
corresponding variables going back one or two years. For example, if data for energy exports 
for 2000 are not available for a country, we have substituted it with the energy export data for 
1999 or, if data for 1999 are unavailable as well, with data for 1998. When working with 
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developing country data, such imputation of value of missing values is not uncommon in the 
literature (see Meyer et al. 2009), and helps minimise loss of observations on account of 
missing data. Imputation is mostly done for fuel and mineral exports, and no more than 6% of 
these data are imputed in the 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 periods. However, availability of 
these data in 2003 is comparatively low so the extent of imputation for 2004-2006 is higher at 
17% for fuels and 14% for minerals. Importantly, a comparison of the 2003 data with the 
2001 and 2002 data show that the latter are within 3 percentage points of the 2003 value for 
about 90% of all countries with comparable data for these years. Hence, we conclude that the 
exercise involving imputation could not have affected our estimation significantly. 
As evident from the above discussion, we have data for nine years: 1998-2006, for up 
to 133 destinations of Chinese economic cooperation related investment. We aggregate the 
data into three periods – 1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006 – and use period aggregates 
for the investment variable as the dependent variable in our regression analysis.
15
 This 
technique, variations of which are widely used in the economics literature (see Barro, 1991; 
Bhaumik, Gangopadhyay and Krishnan, 2009), ensures that our results are not affected by 
year-specific idiosyncratic spikes in the investment data. We did not pool the data for all nine 
years together because such pooling would have obscured the changing nature of Chinese 
economic cooperation related investment, if indeed there were a change in the determinants 
of ECI over time. While we did not have any reason to believe a priori that these 
determinants would be different across the different time periods, our approach allows the 
data to suggest whether there were actually any change in the determinants of such 
investment over time. To verify the robustness of our results, we later supplement this by 
pooling together the data for all nine years, and estimating equation (2) using panel data 
technique. 
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 For any one of these three time periods, we have data on between 92 and 118 destinations for 
economic cooperation related investment. 
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Also, to eliminate the problem of endogeneity, we use lagged values of the 
explanatory variables. For example, we explain the variation in the 1998-2000 aggregates of 
economic cooperation related investment using 1997 values of the independent variables. 
And, data for 1993 to 1997 are used to obtain expected growth and the standard deviation of 
per capita GDP for the same time period.  
 The distributions of the natural log of ECI (LECI) for the three periods appear in 
Figure 2. A right-ward shift in the distribution is quite evident, indicative of an increase in 
Chinese economic cooperation investment across countries over time. Before reporting the 
full descriptive statistics for ECI and its regressors, we also highlight the relationship between 
ECI and some recipient country characteristics that have been the source of many discussions 
in popular discourses about Chinese overseas investment.  
In Figure 3, we report the relationship between ECI and the natural resource richness 
of the recipient countries, as captured by the shares of energy (FUEL) and non-energy 
minerals (MINERAL) in their exports. In Figure 4, we report the relationship between ECI 
and the institutional quality (CORRFREE) of and the political freedom (POLRIGHT) in the 
recipient countries. Figure 3 suggests that if one considers only countries that are rich in 
natural resources, with energy or non-energy minerals accounting for more than 30% of their 
exports, a mild positive relationship may be observed between ECI and natural resource 
richness of the recipient countries. However, there is a large variation in ECI in countries for 
whom the natural resource intensiveness of exports is less than 20%. Overall, if one ignores 
the outliers in the top right and bottom left quadrants of the scatter diagrams, there is little 
sign of any pattern between ECI and these recipient country characteristics. Similarly, Figure 
4 is not indicative of any definitive patterns between ECI and corruption and political rights 
in these recipient countries.  
INSERT Figures 2-4 about here 
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The descriptive statistics for ECI and our regressors are reported in Table 1, 
separately for the three aforementioned time periods.
16
 Some interesting things are 
immediately obvious from these statistics. First, while the average recipient country of 
China’s ECI is quite developed, with a per capita income of $9,000-10,000 in all the three 
periods, there is a huge variation in their state of development. Hence, if indeed economic 
cooperation related investment is a strategic tool for projection of China’s soft power and 
strategic interests, it is targeted at a wide range of countries, developed and developing. 
Second, the average investment recipient country is quite far from China, with their capital 
cities separated by about 9,000 kilometres, on average. This is consistent with the popular 
perception about China’s increasing strategic interests in other continents like Africa and 
Latin America. Third, to the extent that such investment is aimed at ensuring Chinese 
companies’ control of natural resources, fuel (i.e., oil and gas) is much more important than 
other natural resources. The share of fuel in the exports of the average investment recipient 
country is about 15% or higher. However, this share declined from a peak of 19.5% for the 
2001-03 period to 14.6% for the 2004-06 period, indicating that China may not be as 
focussed on oil and gas as it used to be earlier this decade. Finally, while the Chinese state is 
not averse to doing business with corrupt countries, contrary to popular perceptions, it does 
not have a cosy relationship with dictatorial and tyrannical regimes. While the average 
recipient country scores 43 on the 100-point corruption scale (100 being least corrupt), it 
scores 3-3.3 on the 7-point political rights scale (1 being the best). Indeed, while the 
corruption score of the average country has remained steady at around 43 over time, the 
political rights score has improved from 3.29 in 1998-2000 to 3.02 in 2004-06. 
INSERT Table 1 about here 
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5. Discussion of Regression Results 
The regression estimates for equation (2), augmented by the interaction terms, are reported in 
Table 2, as are the robust standard errors within parentheses. We report the estimates of six 
models. Models (1) – (3) use as the measure for resource richness the share of the fuel 
(energy) exports in total exports of the countries that are the destinations of China’s economic 
cooperation related investment, while models (4) – (6) use the share of ores and minerals 
(non-energy mining) exports in total exports of these countries. Note that our regression 
coefficients for the interaction terms are largely insignificant; and, even when they are 
statistically significant, they are very small and not economically meaningful. Hence, in the 
rest of this section, we shall not discuss them any further. 
INSERT Table 2 about here 
The F-statistics for all six models are significant at the 1% level, and the R-squared 
values range between 0.41 and 0.48, indicating that the regression models fit the data 
reasonably well.
17
 To recapitulate, one aim of our exercise was to see whether a specification 
that is used in the literature to explain the magnitude and direction of FDI flows also explains 
well the magnitude and direction of Chinese economic cooperation related investment. If it 
did – which seems to be the case – we could infer that an important use of such investment, a 
tool to promote Chinese strategic interests overseas, is to facilitate outward FDI by Chinese 
companies. In light of the goodness of fit of our models to the inter-country variation in the 
flow of such investment, it would be reasonable to make that inference. Further, we should 
note that the specification worked better for the 1998-2000 and 2001-03 periods than for the 
2004-06 period, at least when fuel is used as the proxy for natural resources, perhaps 
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 For the sake of comparison, the models estimated by Buckley et al. (2007), which use a similar 
framework to explain the direction of Chinese outward FDI, provide adjusted R-square values of 




indicating that the Chinese state’s economic cooperation related investment was a much more 
important tool for facilitating outward FDI during the early years of internationalisation by 
Chinese companies. This is perfectly consistent with the existing literature which suggests 
that EMNEs require more help during their early stage of internationalisation. 
Next, we should discuss whether the stylised specification explains inter-recipient 
country variation in economic cooperation related investment in a way that is qualitatively 
consistent with the stylised FDI literature. For example, if a country with a higher aggregate 
GDP receives a larger quantity of such investment, it would be consistent with the stylised 
result that larger economies receive more FDI. The consistency of our results with the 
stylised FDI literature would provide further evidence, albeit indirect, that Chinese economic 
cooperation related investment is a strategic tool to facilitate the outward FDI of CMNEs. 
Before embarking on that discussion, let us first summarise our results:  
(i) The (log of) GDP of a country had the expected positive impact on China’s 
economic cooperation related investment in that country only in the 2001-2003 period, and 
this coefficient is significant only at the 5% level.  
(ii) Chinese economic cooperation related investment increases sharply with a decline 
in the level of development of a country, the state of development being inversely related to 
the GDP per capita. This is hardly surprising; developing countries would be the natural 
destination of these investments which primarily involve construction projects. 
(iii) Ceteris paribus, Chinese economic cooperation related investment is higher for 
countries that are culturally closer to China.  
(iv) Such investment is higher in countries with which China has significant trading 
relationship. Interestingly, this is true only several years (2004-2006 period regression) after 
China’s accession to the WTO. 
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(v) There is some support for the hypothesis that economic cooperation related 
investment would be higher in countries where the business environment or institutional 
quality is good. The level of investment is positively associated with the extent of freedom 
from corruption. However, the strength of the relationship is weak, suggesting that corruption 
in a country, or institutional quality in general, may not be a strong deterrent for the Chinese 
state’s desire to do business with that country. 
(vi) There is some support for the hypothesis that China’s economic cooperation 
related investment would be higher for resource rich countries. But the correlation between 
the extent of a country’s resource richness and Chinese investment is not economically 
significant (i.e., the regression coefficients have small magnitudes). Further, while such 
investment was statistically related to a country’s energy resources up to 2003, during the 
2004-2006 period investment was affected by non-energy resources alone. 
  (vii) There is statistical and economically meaningful support for the hypothesis that 
the economic cooperation related investment is higher for countries where political rights are 
weak for data in the 1998-2000 and 2004-2006 periods.
18
 However, this result is not robust to 
the choice of our proxy for the recipient countries’ resource richness. The estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant if our proxy for resource richness for a country is the 
proportion of non-energy minerals in its exports. This could be a reflection of China’s 
investment in African countries that are, on average, much richer in non-energy minerals than 
in fossil fuel, and hence whose impact on the political rights coefficient is larger in the 
“mineral” specification. 
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To check the robustness of our results, we also estimate the model using random 
effects panel regression.
19
 The estimates are reported in Table 3. The Wald χ2 statistics 
indicate that both models have significant explanatory power with R-squared values (both 
within- and between-countries) of around 0.40. Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier tests 
indicate the appropriateness of the random effects panel model versus pooled regression. The 
coefficient estimates confirm our previous findings that economic fundamentals matter. 
Consistently, we find that Chinese economic cooperation investments are directed more to 
countries with lower per capita income, and to countries with which China has significant 
trading relationships. In addition, such investment is higher in countries that are energy rich 
and where the cost of doing business is lower on account of cultural similarity. There is once 
again some evidence that institutional quality (i.e., freedom from corruption) matters; in 
particular, economic cooperation investments are larger in countries with less perceived 
corruption. Once again, in the “mineral” specification, there is support for the hypothesis that 
China might not be averse to dealing with countries with weak political rights. But the 
statistical significance of this result is weaker than those reported in Table 2; it is significant 
only at the 10% level.  
In Section 3 of this paper, we had discussed the stylised nature of the impact of our 
explanatory variables on FDI flows and had speculated about the likely impact of these 
variables on the magnitude and direction of Chinese economic cooperation related investment 
flows, under the assumption of complementarity between the China’s ECI and the outward 
FDI of the CMNEs, for which there is prima facie evidence. Our results suggest that the 
hypothesis of the aforementioned complementarity is difficult to reject. Indeed, our 
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 Random effects panel regression is used because two of our regressors (physical and cultural 
distance) are time invariant. Fixed effects panel regression requires within-country variation over 
time. We should note that one limitation of the random effects model is that if the country effects are 




explanatory variables have very similar impact on China’s economic cooperation related 
investment as on Chinese outward FDI, the latter documented elsewhere in the literature (see 
Buckley et al., 2008); ECI is determined largely by economic fundamentals and resource 
availability. While causality is far from established, we are able to make the reasonable claim 
that China’s economic cooperation related investment is at least partly aimed at facilitating 
the outward FDI of the country’s MNEs. We discuss the implications of this complementarity 
in the concluding section. 
 
6. Conclusion 
With implicit government support, Chinese firms undertake large scale contract projects in a 
number of countries under the auspices of economic cooperation. While there are suggestions 
that these activities is an extension of China’s soft power aimed at facilitating Chinese FDI in 
those countries, often for access to natural resources, there is no systematic analysis of this in 
the literature. In this paper, our working hypothesis is that China’s ECI is used to facilitate 
outward FDI, especially to countries that are rich in natural resources. Hence, we use as the 
basis for our empirical exercise the gravity model that is used in the stylised literature to 
examine the direction of investment flows. In our empirical specification, we also control for 
institutional quality and political characteristics of the investment recipient countries, to 
account for the popular wisdom that the Chinese state (and firms) often does business with 
countries where political rights and institutional quality are weak.  
Our results suggest that the pattern of investment is indeed explained well by factors 
that are used in the stylised literature to explain directional patterns of outward FDI, namely, 
economic fundamentals and resource richness of the recipient countries. The impact of 
economic fundamentals is economically much more meaningful than the resource richness of 
the investment recipient countries. The results also demonstrate that, contrary to popular 
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perception, China’s economic cooperation related investment is more likely to flow to 
countries with low levels of corruption which is correlated with institutional quality in 
general. There is weak support, if any, for the hypotheses that China favours doing business 
with countries where political rights are limited.  
Aside from the political economic implications for Chinese economic cooperation 
related investment and the country’s outward FDI, our results have significant implications 
for EMNEs in general: in order to successfully internationalise using outward FDI, it may be 
important (even imperative) for aspiring firms to maintain linkages with their respective 
governments. Since relationships are developed over time, older and well established firms 
are more likely to be able to leverage the state’s help than relatively new firms. Further, an 
alliance between the state and firms aspiring to internationalise might require a greater 
alignment of their interests, such that government support is more likely to be provided to 
firms that operate in industries like natural gas and oil that involve the strategic interests of 
the state. Finally, such alliance might be useful only if the government itself has sufficient 
soft or hard power to facilitate the internationalisation process of domestic firms. To the 
extent that the state’s support is critical in the internationalisation process, therefore, firms 
from relatively weak countries that cannot project power but may be part of regional alliances 
are more likely to internationalise regionally, while firms from larger and more powerful 
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Figure 1. China’s economic cooperation related investment (2004-2006) and outward foreign 




















Note: Data for 104 countries are included here. A country is included if data for both economic 
cooperation investment (ECI) and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) are available for all 




Figure 2. Distribution of China’s economic cooperation related investment (in natural log)  



























Figure 3. China’s economic cooperation related investment (in natural log) against the share of energy 
(FUEL) and non-energy exports (MINERAL) to total exports, 1998-2000 (left panel); 2001-2003 
















































































































Figure 4. China’s economic cooperation related investment (in natural log) against freedom from 
corruption (CORRFREE) and political rights (POLRIGHT), 1998-2000 (left panel); 2001-2003 








































































































Notes: CORRFREE is an index from 0 to 100 with high values indicating low incidence of 






Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
  2004-2006     2001-2003     1998-2000     
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
ECI 118 353.61 564.83 115 156.73 279.31 92 123.25 277.07 
GDP 118 348 1,070.00 115 329 1,010.00 92 368 1,020.00 
GDPPC 118 10,106.36 9,579.95 115 10,001.62 10,259.20 92 8,650.55 8,834.63 
GEODIST 118 8,960.99 3,861.28 115 8,881.66 3,999.81 92 9,125.90 3,968.26 
EXPGROW 118 2.11 2.64 115 2.36 2.07 92 1.47 3.15 
INSTAB 118 2.32 1.50 115 2.61 2.24 92 3.07 3.39 
CULDIST 118 0.02 0.13 115 0.02 0.13 92 0.02 0.15 
BITRADE  118 5,558.69 18,212.42 115 3,259.00 10,963.18 92 2,637.32 8,502.16 
CORRFREE 118 43.89 23.39 115 43.96 25.04 92 42.41 24.70 
FUEL 118 14.55 24.22 115 19.49 29.68 92 16.09 27.41 
MINERAL 118 8.13 14.55 115 7.56 12.86 92 8.36 15.90 
POLRIGHT 118 3.02 1.97 115 3.22 2.14 92 3.29 2.15 
Notes:  ECI and BITRADE are in millions of US dollars. GDP (in billions) and GDPPC are in constant 2000 international (PPP) dollars.  
GEODIST is in kilometres. EXPGROW and INSTAB are both in percent form. Freedom from corruption (CORRFREE) is a proxy for  





Table 2. Regression estimates (OLS – period average) 
 
 “Fuel” specification  “Mineral” specification  
 2004-06 2001-03 1998-00 2004-06 2001-03 1998-00 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant   8.91**   9.31***    8.19   5.20   8.60**   6.09 
   (3.96)   (3.28)   (5.75)   (3.42)   (3.74)   (5.79) 
(Log) GDP   0.25   0.40**   0.41   0.24   0.42**   0.40 
   (0.19)   (0.16)   (0.26)   (0.19)   (0.16)   (0.26) 
(Log) GDP per capita - 1.20*** - 1.10*** - 1.57*** - 0.91*** - 1.19*** - 1.42*** 
   (0.29)   (0.28)   (0.37)   (0.29)   (0.31)   (0.36) 
(Log) Distance - 0.33 - 0.60** - 0.34 - 0.24 - 0.44 - 0.21 
   (0.35)   (0.24)   (0.47)   (0.34)   (0.29)   (0.45) 
Expected growth - 0.01 - 0.11   0.12* - 0.02 -0.10   0.10 
   (0.07)   (0.09)   (0.06)   (0.08) (0.09)   (0.07) 
Macro. volatility - 0.02 - 0.09 - 0.01   0.01 -0.06 - 0.01 
   (0.12)   (0.09)   (0.05)   (0.12) (0.10)   (0.06) 
Cultural distance   0.95   2.32**   2.52**   0.35   2.35**   2.45** 
   (0.83)   (0.95)   (1.08)   (0.69)   (0.99)   (0.97) 
(Log) bilateral trade   0.50**   0.27   0.28   0.53***   0.28*   0.27  
   (0.20)   (0.16)   (0.21)   (0.20)   (0.17)   (0.21) 
Corruption free   0.03*   0.02   0.03*    0.02*   0.01   0.03* 
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Fuel rich   0.03   0.04*   0.05*** - - - 
   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)    
Mineral rich - - -   0.09**   0.02   0.03 
      (0.05)   (0.12)   (0.04) 
Political rights   0.16    0.21    0.32*   0.31**   0.15    0.33** 
   (0.13)   (0.14)   (0.17)   (0.12)   (0.10)   (0.14) 
Fuel rich  - 0.0003 - 0.0004   0.0002 - - - 
    Corruption free   (0.0003)   (0.0003)   (0.0003)    
Mineral rich  - - - - 0.0012* - 0.0004 - 0.0002 
    Corruption free      (0.0007) (0.0015)   (0.0006) 
Fuel rich  - 0.0017 - 0.0047 - 0.0076*** - - - 
    Political rights   (0.0039)   (0.0037)   (0.0029)    
Mineral rich  - - - - 0.0096* - 0.0034 - 0.0024 
     Political rights      (0.0056)   (0.0162)   (0.0056) 
       
Observations   118   115   92   118   115   92 
R-squared   0.41   0.48   0.48   0.41   0.46   0.44 
F-statistic   7.70***   7.73***   6.61***   7.62***   8.24***   6.60*** 
Notes: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) 
Constant   6.51*   4.75  
   (3.80)   (3.85) 
(Log) GDP   0.46***   0.45*** 
   (0.16)   (0.17) 
(Log) GDP per capita - 1.35*** - 1.25*** 
   (0.25)   (0.26) 
(Log) Distance - 0.38 - 0.28 
   (0.33)   (0.33) 
Expected growth   0.07*   0.07 
   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Macro. volatility   0.004  0.007 
   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Cultural distance   2.51***   2.36*** 
   (0.86)   (0.87) 
(Log) bilateral trade   0.28**   0.30** 
   (0.14)   (0.14) 
Corruption free   0.02**   0.01 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Fuel rich   0.03** - 
   (0.02)    
Mineral rich -   0.02 
    (0.03) 
Political rights   0.11    0.16*  
   (0.10)   (0.09) 
Fuel rich  - 0.00003 - 
    Corruption free   (0.0002)    
Mineral rich  - - 0.00001 
    Corruption free    (0.0004) 
Fuel rich  - 0.00394 - 
    Political rights   (0.0027)  
Mineral rich  - - 0.00424 
     Political rights    (0.0041) 
Period dummies   Yes   Yes 
   
Observations   325   325 
Countries   133   133 
R-squared (within)   0.42   0.42 
R-squared (between)   0.40   0.38 
Wald χ
2
 statistic   236.26***   233.75*** 
Breusch-Pagan LM χ
2 
statistic   30.35***   34.43*** 
Notes: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
